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ABSTRACT
This paper uses a data set composed of combinations of
full brothers, half brothers as well as fathers and sons to
measure the effect of common family background on households'
income and wealth. While the data is drawn from a nineteenth
century population, the intra—class correlation (after the effects
of age, occupation, nativity, residence and duration in the
economy have been removed) for income ranges from .13 to .18
which is similar to that found in modern samples. Intra—class
correlations for wealth are significantly higher (.18 to .35)
than those for income. The addition of fathers' observed charac-
teristics to the sweeping regressions reduces the unobserved
common background effect shared by brothers by about twenty
percent.
The intra—class correlations of half brothers were lower
than those observed for full brothers though the small differences
between the two groups suggest that fathers played a dominant
role in the transmission of the common family effect. Unobserved
background was decomposed into individual and family effects
by a variance components procedure. The individual effect was
dominant for income while the family effect was dominant for
wealth.
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Family members, except perhaps spouses, are certainly genetically and highly
likely to be environmentally more similar than unrelated individuals. This
unobserved common background may very well make family members more similar
in measured socioeconomic position than would be expected for unrelated individuals
with comparable observable individual characteristics. In addition, if parents
are egalitarian within the family, they may make compensatory transfers in
response to differences among siblings. Parental choices of this sort would
also make siblings more similar than comparable unrelated individuals in terms
of socioeconomic outcomes. In the first instance, family members are more
socioeconomically alike because of similarities in backgrounds and characteristics.
In the second instance family members are more socloeconornically alike because
dissimilarities in sibling characteristics trigger compensatory activities
by parents.
On the other hand, efficient parental human capital transfers to children
would not ameliorate the economic effects of ability differences among siblings
assuming ability enhances human capital acquisition. The effect of the family
on the distribution of socioeconomic rewards depends, then, on the variation
in individual characteristics within and between families, market rewards
for those characteristics and the rules of family allocation of parental resources
among children (see Becker and Tomes; Behrman, Pollak and Taubman; Ishikawa;
Loury; and Sheshinskj and Weiss). Behrman, Pollak and Taubman distinguish
two allocational models: the wealth model and the separable earnings—bequest
model. If there are positive material wealth transfers, the former predicts
that such transfers fully compensate for earnings differences. The separable
earnings—bequest model predicts equal transfers. Children may, in either2
case, have different expected earnings if they have different abilities even
if parents have equal concern for their children.
Failure to account for common family background effects may bias estimates
of the effects of measured individual characteristics (e.g. the return to
education). Considerable effort has been devoted to this problem using sibling
data although Sheshinski and Weiss argue that the importance of the bias depends
upon the family resource allocation rule. Moreover, whether the use of sibling
data lessens or amplifies bias problems depends on whether the common family
effect fully accounts for all ommitted effects and on the possibility of measure-
ment error and simultaneity problems.(See Griliches, 1979.) Common family
background effects are, however, interesting in their own right precisely
because of the importance of the family resource allocation rule and its embedded
parental preferences. In addition, failure to account for such effects would
lead one to overestimate the degree to which the variance in observable socio-
economic indicators is truly stochastic, unless common family background is
completely reflected in the observable characteristics that individuals have
or choose to acquire. If the potential effects of family background are not
completely reflected in observable individual characteristics, ignoring family
background may cause one to overlook important aspects of the creation and
perpetuation of economic differences among individuals and across generations.
Even where the effects are fully or partially reflected in observable individual
characteristics, we may view these individual characteristics differently
knowing that, in part, they embody a family background shared with other individ-
uals. Finally, if common family background effects are substantial, they
may affect greatly policy development aimed at changing the distribution of
socioeconomic rewards among individuals since the family then becomes an important3
social institution affecting the distribution of socioeconomic rewards in
addition to the government.
In this paper we explore the degree to which family background, whose source
may be genetics environmental and/or behavioral, explains the variance in
indicators of socioeconomic position for individuals from an economy that
would appear to be quite different from the economy from which modern data
are drawn ——19thcentury Utah. Our data allow us to consider two different
kinds of family relationships that between fathers and their sons and that
between brothers. For the latter, we have samples of full brothers raised
in the same home sharing a common father and mother and half brothers raised
in separate homes sharing only a common father. We use two indicators of
socioeconomic position, wealth holdings and income.
We focus on those aspects of common family background that are not measured
directly but whose presence can be inferred from correlations between the
observed socioeconomic positions of family members when the effects of individual
characteristics have been factored out. We also consider the differences
between measured and unmeasured common background by accounting for the observed
individual characteristics of a common father, including the father's income
or wealth, and for the characteristics of the common family such as family
size.
Families can, of course, influence individual choices about individually
acquired characteristics. However, in a series of studies over the past several
years, it has been found that when the effects of individual characteristics
have been accounted for there remains an unmeasured component of the variance
in measures of socioeconomic position that can be attributed to membership
in a common family by siblings. That is, residuals are correlated when individuals4
are ordered by family membership. For example, Table 1, combined from the
summary work of Jencks and his associates and from a survey by Griliches,
provides the intraclass correlation coefficients for eight recent studies
using sibling data. The intraclass correlation coefficient, which measures
the degree of association between individuals who share the attribute of belonging
to the same family, also measures the percentage of the variance in the socio-
economic indicator that can be attributed to the common characteristic, in
this case family membership. The indicator in these studies is the logarithm
of income or earnings although many of the studies also use occupational status
as an indicator.
For each of the samples of brothers, there is a residual correlation that
is significant. That is, brothers are unlike randomly paired individuals
in their economic position as measured by income. In addition, the variance
that can be explained by sibling membership in a common family exceeds that
which can be explained by observable individual characteristics ——common
family background dominates other measured determinants of a brother's income.
Jencks argues that the NORC sample provides the best estimate of the intraclass
correlation (r=.129) and that the range of raw estimates of r Is likely to
be .12 to .28. That is, family background explains 12 to 28 percent of the
variance in the logarithm of income. When suitable adjustments are made for
sample and measurement bias, Jencks et al. argue that family background probably
explains between 15 and 35 percent of the variance of log income ——asignificant
addition to the variance explained by observable individual characteristics.
Brittain, using a small sample of brothers from Cleveland, finds a much
higher intraclass correlation for log income than any of the studies summarized
by Jencks et al. He estimates an intraclass correlation in the .35—.45 range5
but his is the only study with estimates this high. The intraclass correlation
for occupational status measured by the Duncan scale is still higher around
.48. This may be attributable, in part, to the way that the status measure
is created. But in any event, the correlation attributable to family background
again exceeds that explainable by individual characteristicsCR2 is usually
in the .20 to .35 range for occupational status).
The substantial difference that Taubman finds between monozygote and dizygote
twins has ld him and his associates to explore models that separate the common
family background effect into genetic and environmental components. Goldberger
has been skeptical of th? assumptions necessary to pursue this approach but
potential problems in modelling the nature of the family background effect
do not call into question the presence of the family effect itself.
Chamberlain, Griliches and others have explored the possibilites that there
is a common factor accounting for the family effect in a structural model
of ability schooling, occupational status and log income, taking advantage
of the identifiability properties of multiple indicators for latent variable
models. Chamberlain and Taubman et al. have extended the latent variable model
so that the unobserved factor has a variance components structure. These efforts
have been quite successful in changing the estimates of the returns to schooling
but less successful In pushing the various estimates toward a common point.
Chamberlain and Griliches have also explored extensions of these models to
include the possibility that there are two factors that account for the family
effect.
Our aim is initially more modest: Using single equation models, we estimate
the variance component or the intraclass correlation attributable to individuals
sharing a common family background and explore how the estimates differ with6
the nature of the socioeconomic indicator, the nature of the family relation-
ship and the nature of family background measures available. We also consider
differences between unobserved individual and family effects.
II THE DATA
Our data are drawn from some or all of the following sources: census manu-
scripts of 1850, 1860, 1870, 1880 and 1900; tax assessment records of 1870,
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1859,1861, 1866, 1870, 1875, 1880, 1885, 1890, 1895, 1900; and family vital
records from the Genealogical Library of the LDS Church.
Estimates of wealth were obtained from the Census manuscripts of 1850,
1860 and 1870 and from tax assessment records for 1870, 1880, 1890 and 1900.
We sampled from both records in 1870 in order to splice the wealth series
from 1850 to 1900 at decade intervals. Both tax assessment and census records
provide estimates of gross rather than net wealth.
Income estimates are obtained from the financial records of the LDS Church
for the 12 years noted earlier. Essentially we cover five year intervals
from 1855 to 1900. LDS financial records indicate the contribution an individual
made to the Church. Church members accepted the moral obligation to contribute
a tithe——ten percent of one's income. In eight of the twelve sample years
we have a record of the percentage that an individual's contribution was relative
to this full tithe. These assessments of tithing paid versus tithing owed
were made by local Church leaders who would personally know the individual
contributor. The individual would also be consulted as to the percentage
of a full tithe that he or she paid. Families usually made their contribution
under the name of the male spouse if there was one although some young men7
contributed independently to the Church. The combination of the amount contributed
with the percentage of this amount relative to a full tithe yields an estimate
of income. We made adjustments for who those reported income in a particular
year but for whom we did not have percentages by averaging the percentage
paid from other years.
Occupational data have been collected from each census manuscript, available
from 1850 to 1900. Occupations were transcribed into a three—digit code that
combined occupations that were essentially the same, e.g. lawyer and attorney.
We did not create an occupational status scale. Rather, for purposes of analysis,
these codes were aggregated into four categories: white collar workers, managers,
and proprietors (W); farmers, ranchers, dairy owners, etc. (F); craft workers
(C); laborers, farm laborers and other unskilled occupations (L). This left
a heterogeneous mixture of occupations that were largely service oriented,
such as hotel clerks, policemen, lower level clerks, etc. which we classified
in a fifth group as service workers (S).
Both census and genealogical records provide place of birth and age. When
these sources disagreed the genealogical record was used. From these two
records we could obtain most of the vital statistics of interest, including
birth, death and marriage information as well as the implied Information about
household location at particular times, family size and family structure.
These records also provide sibling names (linking brothers) and multiple marriage
information (linking half brothers).
We used place information to provide a record of residence and internal
migration and to provide an estimate of the length of time a household had
been within the economy (T). For analysis purposes, we consider only rural
(R) and urban (U) residence where urban is defined as Salt Lake County.8
We have linked individuals through time and across records and we have
linked these individual histories by family relationship. The core of the
sample was created by linking census wealth records using name, location,
age and birth place data. We then added a random sample of the households
from each census year that did not appear in more than one of these censuses.
We separately coded links that were "certain" from those for which there were
some discrepancies in name spellings or age estimates between census years,
"uncertains". We were, however, conservative in our efforts and subsequent
analysis has shown no statistically significant differences between "certains"
and "uricertains" and hence we no longer carry the coding distinguishing the
two. To this core of linked and randomly sampled individuals, we added as
many LDS financial records as we could, linked by name across the records
and through the years from 1855 to 1900. We then reversed the procedure: first
linking households in the Church financial records and then adding as much
census information as was possible.
We added to this samples now linked through time and between census and
church financial records, records from either the censuses or financial records
that were potentially fathers and sons. We verified these father—son links
using the family vital statistic records from the Genealogical Library. We
then searched the family vital statistic records for those in the core sample
creating pointers linking those within the sample who were either fathers
and sons or brothers. In addition, we added any records from the population
data for those we could identify as sons or brothers of those in the sample
by using the family vital statistic information.
Not all family links between brothers occur with a link to a father. Since
we searched the family vital statistic records for those in our samples we9
would often find brothers without finding fathers, who might have been dead
or who might not have migrated to Utah with their sons. This particular aspect
of the sample means that the sibling connections cover the full age range
in each year of the sample and are not restricted to be young in the early
years. We also found a number of new households that were formed over the
fifty year period where we observed the father for a some years and then observed
the father and son. Because of the extended period over which we sampled
we also observe fathers and sometimes sons who die and a small group of three
generation links.
We added to this linked data additional wealth data from the tax assessments
and probates as well as occupational data from the 1880 and 1900 censuses.
For these records we have neither population data nor random samples from
population data. Rather we sought out only those records for individuals
already in our sample. Otherwise, however, we have population data for wealth
from 1850 to 1870 and income from 1855 to 1900.
When we added data, anomolies would appear. At each point we purged from
the data those links that became questionable with the new information. Obvious
checks included: records past death or for an individual who was "too old";
records prior to birth or for an individual who was "too young"; the same
name on multiple records from the same source in the same year; substantial
age inconsistencies.
Webel ieve that we have been fairly conservative at each point but we should
note that all linking isbynames with the attendant problems of mispelling
andsame names for different Individuals. We tried to avoid both problems
by not selecting or subsequently eliminating those with common names where
the probability was high that there would be several individuals with the10
same name (e.g. John Jones, James Green). We have differentially coded "certain"
family links from those that were "less certain".
The completed data set is essentially a panel, although an individual need
not appear in each year either because the individual migrated in or formed
a household later in the period; because the individual migrated out or died
during the period; or because we could not make a link in a particular year.
It Is a panel with the unique characteristic that it Is drawn from a fifty
year history of an economy and that it has immediate family links. Tables
2 and 3 provide means and variances by year for fathers, Sons and brothers.
III FAMILY EFFECTS ANDINDIVIDUALINCOME
We test for unobserved family background effects by first estimating several
variations of the now standard human capital specification for Individual
I n come,
(1) ln (Yjj) =XjjB
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is the family component of the variance. For some specifications we pooi
the data over all or part of the 50 year period and in these instances impose
a fixed effects model on the aggregate yearly effects. The complete set of
regressions that serve as a basis for our analysis is found in the appendix.
The general properties of the regression results can be seen in the following
pooled regression for brothers taken from Table Al in the appendix:11
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The regressions are normalized on farmers living in Salt Lake County in
1900 who are U.S. born. Elsewhere we have discussed the properties of these
regressions at length, focusing on the effects of time within the economy
(T), life cycle patterns (A and A2) and changes in residence (R) and occupation
(W,C,S,L,F) in separate papers. (Kearl, Pope and Wimmer, 1980; Kearl and
Pope, 1983a; Kearl and Pope, 1983b.) We note here that virtually all of the
individual characteristics that we measure have the expected statistically
significant effects on ln(y) but that like comparable analysis on modern data
these individual characteristics do not explain a large percentage of the
variance in log income.
Briefly, we find a pronounced concave life cycle in income with the peak
occurring around age 45. Time within the economy (1) has a positive effect
on a incomewhile those living in the rural areas (R) have lower
incomes, ceteris paribus. Whitecollar workers (W) have higher incomes than
do farmers while craft (C) and service (5) workers have incomes that are not
significantly different from those of farmers. Laborers (L) have incomes
substantially lower than farmers and those in other occupational categories.
We find that foreign born have incomes a bit higher than comparable US born
households. Finally, the pattern of year effects for income essentially accounts12
for price changes and growth and parallels the price decline over the 50 year
period in the rest of the United States. While the relative magnitudes and
significance of the coefficients change somewhat with specification and sample,
the patterns are essentially the same for all the regressions reported in
the appendix.
We used these estimates to sweep from individual incomes the effects of
measured individual characteristics. Rather than estimating the variance component
directly, we then estimated the intraclass correlation for related pairs using
the resulting residuals. The residuals were stacked so that a member of the
related pair appears as both a dependent and independent variable in a simple
regression of residuals on residuals. This is equivalent to randomly ordering
the observations. The resulting coefficient (the intercept should be zero
since It is the expected value of the residuals) is an estimate of the intraclass
correlation coefficient. A nonzero coefficient indicates that a common omitted
effect links the paired observations that does not link observations of individuals
who are not related. It therefore provides evidence that there is a "family"
effect on individual income that is shared by the related individuals.
We find a significant unobserved family background effect for brothers,
Table 4. Sharing a common family background explains around 20 percent of
the variance In the logarithm of income. Brothers incomes are simply unlike
those of randomly selected unrelated paris of individuals even when we account
for similarities between brothers that are observable, including ages nativity
and occupational choices. Part of the correlation between the economic position
of brothers could be explained by the correlation in the ages (compare specific-
ations 1 and 2, Table 4) reflecting "closer" positions on the income life13
cycle than those shared by randomly paired unrelated individuals. In fact,
this effect is unimportant.
While age, residence and birthplace correlations between brothers affect
the intraclass correlation estimate very little (compare specifications 1
or 2 with 3), it is clear that part of the influence of family is reflected
in occupational choices that brothers make. The intraclass correlation falls
about 10 precent when the effect of occupational choice is swept out, implying
that brothers' occupational choices are correlated. This is, of course, consistent
with the considerable contemporary evidence on unobserved family effects and
occupational choices.
The size of the estimated family background effect for brothers' incomes
is at the midpoint of the range. The importance of the unobserved
family background variable(s) relative to that of the observable individual
characteristics is also consistent with modern data. Hence, in terms of the
size of the estimated family background effect, the importance of this effect
relative to observed individual characteristics and the partial transmission
of the family effect through occupational choices made by siblings, our data
reveal similar patterns to those in modern data even though our sample was
created differently and drawn from a dissimilar economy——one that is poor,
agrarian with little emphasis on formal education. Differences among families
appear to be an important and robust determinant of the variance in the distrib—
ution of income among individuals.
In the following sections we consider evidence from our data about the
nature of the unobserved family background effect that is not available in
contemporary data. We first consider the effect for wealth holdings for essent-
ially the same households for which we have estimated the family effect on14
income. Using both income and wealth as indicators of socioeconomic position,
we then consider differences between full and half brothers. This is followed
by a section where we use a subsample of the data to explore family effects
for brothers and half brothers when we observe the socioeconomic position
of their father. Using a different subsample with multiple observations for
each sib, we then differentiate between unobserved family and unobserved individual
effects.
IV FAMILY EFFECTS AND WEALTh HOLDINGS
We begin with an econometric specification for the logarithm of wealth
holdings comparable to specification (1) for log income:
(4) ln(w) =4.62+.089 A —.0008 A2 +.O14 T —.147 FB —.368 R
(.16) (.007) (.00008) (.0024) (.034) (.038)
+.24 W —.39 C —.17 S —.53 L +43 D60 +40 070
(.06)(.05)(.08)(.05) (.05) (.05)




Again the full set of equations used in the estimation of the intraclass
correlation coefficient is found in the appendix. While the relative magnitudes
change somewhat with specification and samples specification (4) provides
a general qualitative summary of the results for the wealth specifications
and the relationship between the estimates for wealth and those for income.15
There is a pronounced concave lifecycle pattern to wealth holdings in our
sample with a peak at age 58 (the comparable age—income peak is at age 45).
Duration within the economy (T) substantially increases wealth holdings and
those who are foreign born or living in the rural area have wealth positions
substantially below US born or those residing in the urban area. For income
we also found a large positive effect for duration and a substantial negative
effect for rural residence. However the effect of foreign birth was positive
for income while it is negative for wealth. White collar workers have wealth
holdings substantially above those for farmers, an effect also seen in income.
However, while service and craft workers have incomes that are not significantly
different from those of farmers, they have wealth holdings that are significantly
lower than those of farmers. Common laborers have substantially lower wealth
holdings and incomes than farmers.
The pattern of year dummies for wealth is more difficult to interpret since
we essentially use them to splice the wealth series in 1870. Hence they reflect
both economic growth and changes In the measured variable between census and
tax assessment records.
Table 5 provides estimates for the intraclass correlation coefficient using
the logarithm of wealth as an indicator of socioeconomic position and when
the effects of the observed individual characteristics have been swept from
ln(W). We find that unobserved family background explains about 30 percent
of the variance in the log of wealth compared to 20 percent of the variance
in the log of income.
The larger intraclass correlation for wealth is consistent with what would
be expected If individual consumption behavior were determined by permanent
rather than observed income. Transitory elements should be a relatively larger16
component of income than of wealth and hence more of the variance in Income
should be truly stochastic. If individual consumption were determined by
permanent Income, savings would fluctuate with transitory income as would
wealth holdings but the differences in the means between wealth and income
would imply that these fluctuations contributed relatively less to the variance
of wealth. Put differently, differences in family backgrounds are relatively
more important in determining the variance in a more permanent measure of
economic position, wealth, than they are in explaining a measure with a larger
transitory component, income. This suggests that family differences tend to
be associated more closely with permanent differences rather than transitory
differences in the distribution of economic outcomes.
In addition, however, if parents make efficient investment decisions relative
to the human capital accumulation of their children, thereby differentially
investing in siblings in response to differing individual abilities, but want
to be egalitarian within the family, they would compensate those with lesser
ability by engaging in differential intra vivos wealth transfers or provide
compensatory bequests. This compensatory behavior would imply a larger family
background effect on wealth than on income. Indeed, if there were no important
constraints on parental ability to differentially invest according to sib
ability, the intraclass correlation for earnings would be nonzero only if
sibling ability had an unobserved common family component. However, the
transitory elements noted earlier, the likely constraints on parental compensatory
behavior as well as income from capitals do not allow us to interpret the
intraclass correlation for Income as measuring only the unobserved family
element of Individual ability (See Behrman, Pollack and Taubman or Sheshinski
and Weiss). We note that recent attempts to test for efficient human capital17
intergenerational transfers suggest that bequests do not appear to compensate
for differences in ability (Menchik; Tomes).
For both income and wealth, we used a Chow test for differences in the
intraclass correlation by wealth and household size. In neither case did
we find significant evidence which would indicate that, for example, the intraclass
correlation was higher for brothers with wealthy fathers than for brothers
with poor fathers or that family background effects differed systematically
and substantially between "large" families and "small" families. The latter
is a little surprising since, while common backgrounds differ among families,
it would seem that the differences might be correlated with family size. When
we examine these results in a slightly different way below we do find some
family size effect. We also considered systematic variation in the intraclass
correlation with birth order but also failed to find evidence that birth order
systematically affected the intraclass correlation. In this area, however,
our data present some problems since we have a large number of half brothers
which make sib ordering problematic.
These results are based on data pooled from the full fifty year period
covered by our sample. It is possible that the estimates change with time
as, for example, the economy matures, or that our results reflect a compositional
effect. We have estimated comparable intraclass correlations using only cross
sections of sib pairs and, while the estimates vary somewhat, there are no
systematic patterns different from those of the pooled data set. Another
area of concern about reported intraclass correlations is the possiblity of
correlation between observed characteristics and errors such that E(UiX)
0 so that a random effects specification would involve mismeasurement.
Hausman (1978) proposed a specification test which we have applied to some18
of our equations. While the overall X2 test based on the decrease in residual
sums of squares with augmented transformed variables (p. 1269, Hausman, 1978)
is failed with a random effects specification; the problems seem to be centered
on the age variables and the life cycle. Further work will be needed to gauge
the importance of the relationship between U. and some of the X..
Perhaps the most serious concern, at present, is the omission of education
from the sweeping regressions. If formal education has a positive influence
on income and wealth as expected the lack of educational data reduces the
variance explained by the regression and increases the measured common background
effect if the education of siblings is correlated. The mismeasurement of
the intraclass correlation in the sweeping regressions such as occupation,
nativity and place of residence proxy for part of the effect of education.
While virtually all of the Utah population was classified as literate on the
census manuscript, formal education was relatively limited in the nineteenth
century Utah. Nevertheless, further work is needed to bound the effect of
omission of education from the sweeping regressions on the measurement of
the family background effect.
V HALF VERSUS FULL BROThERS
We can separate the contribution of the father to the unobserved family
effect from that of being raised in a common home by considering the differences
between full brothers raised in the same home and half brothers who share
a common father but who, in our samples would not have been raised in a common
home. Table 6 provides estimates when the sample is split this way.
Half brothers, on averages share fewer genes than do full brothers. (Expected
excess homozygosity would be 50% for full brothers and 25% for half brothers.)19
They also, in our sample, do not share a common home since polygynous families
were usually maintained in separate houses or living areas for each wife.
Therefore, half and full brothers would only have similar intraclass correlations
if the dominant component of the family background effect was the contribution
of the father to his children. That is, if the intraclass correlations for
brothers do not differ from those for half brothers, the unobserved family
effects must be primarily non—genetic and primarily attributable to the father's
role in creating a common environment for his sons. Conversely, if half brothers
are no more similar than randomly selected unrelated individuals, then neither
genetics nor the father's role matter and the common family effect would be
attributed solely to the environment shared within a common home. However,
if there are unobserved family background effects for both half and full brothers,
the source of the differences could be both genetic and environmental since
brothers and half brothers differ on both dimensions in our sample.
We clearly do not find that half brothers raised in separate homes are
like randomly selected unrelated individuals. Rather, we find significant
unobserved family background effects for half brothers for both wealth holdings
and for income. Sharing a common father explains about 26 percent of the
variance in log wealth and about 19 percent of the variance in log income
(we continue to find that the common family effect is larger for log wealth
than it is for log income by about 50 percent). Sharing both a common father
and a common mother explains about 30 percent of the variance in log wealth
and about 19 percent of the variance in log income. There is surprisingly
little difference between full brothers and half brothers in this respect
suggesting that in this economy, the father's contribution to the economic20
success of his children dominates other aspects of the unobserved family variable.
The results cast some doubt on a simple genetic explanation.
We note that a relatively larger share of the family effect appears to
be transmitted through correlated occupational choices for half brothers than
for brothers. That is, when individual occupational choices are accounted
for (specification 4), the intraclass correlation for half brothers, still
significant and maintaining the spread between income and wealth, is relatively
smaller than the comparable intraclass correlations for full brothers. That
is, when we account for occupational choices, sharing a common father explains
15 percent of the variance in log income and 23 percent of the variance in
log wealth. This compares with 29 percent and 18 percent, respectively for
those who share a common father and a common mother. It makes sense, of course,
that an important element in the environment shared by half brothers is the
occupational choice of their common father which may very well influence their
occupational choices. However, there remains a substantial correlation in
the economic position of those raised in separate homes even when we account
for this element of their common environment.
VI OBSERVED AND UNOBSERVED COMMON FAMILY BACKGROUNDS
Brothers share attributes of their common father, including those that
are observable such as father's age, occupation, income or wealth. We now
consider the degree to which the common family background effect present in
our data is adequately accounted for by the observed characteristics of the
sibs' father. The observed socioeconomic position of the father might directly
affect sibs because of the advantages or disadvantages the socioeconomic position21
allowed the father to confer on his children. Usually interest in this area
centers on income or wealth transfers but there may be more general direct
effects such as access, information or nepotism. Of course there may be indirect
effects for which the observed socioeconomic position of the father proxies.
These might include home environments if such environments differ systematically
with father's socioeconomic status. Finally, to the degree that there are
capital market imperfections that impede intergenerational human capital transfers,
it would be expected that higher income or wealthier parents would be able
to transfer "more" human capital to all sibs and, of course, having made efficient
investment decisions be more capable of providing differential material wealth
transfers.
Tables A.9 and A.1O provide a summary of regressions with log income and
log wealth as dependent variables using the subsample of brothers for whom
we observe the relevant data for their fathers. The parameter estimates for
the individuals own characteristics do not differ much from the regressions
we discussed earlier and the qualitative properties of the regressions do
not change with the extended specification. To these own characteristics
we have appended those noted in the table for the individual's father and
family.
With the exception of white collar for wealth and white collar and craft
for income, father's occupational choice does not directly affect a son's
income or wealth. A son's income and wealth are also statistically unaffected
by the father's age, time within the economy, birth place or place of residence.
Each of these, as we noted earlier, affect a person's own income or wealth
position and hence each indirectly affects the son's position to the degree
that there is a relationship between a father's income or wealth and his son's22
income or wealth. However, even when we account for the substantial effect
of being a white collar worker on an income or wealth, there
is an additional substantial advantage conferred on the sons of white collar
workers in this economy. This cannot be skill transmittal or else we would
expect also to see significant positive effects froni fathers who were craftsmen
and perhaps significant negative effects from fathers who were unskilled,
common laborers. We observe neither of these, rather there is no significant
relationship between fathers who are unskilled and their son's income or
wealth and the relationship between fathers who are craftsmen and their sons
is negative for income but not significant for wealth.
A father's income positively affects his son's Income as does a
wealth his son's wealth. A ten percent increase in wealth would yield a 1.5
percent increase in a son's wealth. Put differently, a ten percent deviation
between wealth would cause a 1.5 percent deviation between the wealth
of sons. The corresponding elasticity for income is about .1. Both of these,
while statistically significant, would indicate substantial regression toward
the mean if there were no other avenues through which fathers affected sons.
For household size, we find that a son in a larger family will have lower
wealth, ceteris paribus. The sign is also negative for income but the coefficient
is not significant. If the family resource allocational rule first allocated
parental resources for human capital accumulation and then compensated with
differentially allocated material wealth among sibs, family size would be
expected to have negative effects on both income and wealth but a larger effect
on wealth so long as families have different material resources.
We used these regressions to once again purge from the dependent variable
the effects of those individual and family characteristics that were observable23
and then estimated the intraclass correlation for brothers as shown in Table
7. We continue to find a significant unobserved family effect, with unobserved
family background explaining 10 percent of the variation in log income and
19 percent of the variation in log wealth. These compare with 13 and 23 percent
when the observable common background effects are not directly estimated but
are treated as part of the unobservable. Hence, observable common background
characteristics account for only a little over 20 percent of the family effect.
The remaining family affect is not effectIvely proxed by the father's own
socioeconomic position as measured by income, wealth or occupation. This
finding is also consistent with much contemporary work (see Taubman, et al.
for a survey) but most contemporary studies do not have the rich set of charac-
teristics that we have for fathers and hence this finding strengthens somewhat
those drawn from contemporary data. While, as noted above, these results
are roughly consistent with an efficient investment —cum—compensatory transfer
allocational rule, the substantial unobserved family background effect when
observed parental income and wealth are accounted for, suggests that resources
other than material wealth or income are important in intergenerational links.
We can look at the common family effect in a slightly different way by
treating fathers and sons as we have brothers, purging the effects of own
characteristics and then considering the possibilities of correlated residuals
when the individuals are paired by family relationship. Table 8 provides
estimates of the intraclass correlation for log income and wealth of fathers
and sons. It should be noted that the fathers were quite old at the time
the income or wealth was observed contemporaneously with their son's income
or wealth.24
The low intraclass correlation in specification 1 is to be expected given
the pronounced life cycle pattern in both income and wealth holdings since
the life cycle will explain a substantial amount of the variance for individuals
whose ages are separated by a substantial number of years as would be true
for fathers and sons. This result, in a sense, indirectly confirms the presence
of an age—income or age—wealth profile. When the contribution of age to the
economic position of an individual is accounted for, the intraclass correlations
for income are very close to those estimated from brothers. For wealth holdings,
however, we find about 20 percent of the variance is explained by the unobserved
common background shared by fathers and sons. The unobserved background shared
by brothers explains about 30 percent of the variance for brothers.
Considering fathers and sons rather than brothers indicates the ambiguity
in the notion of "unobserved family background". For brothers, family background
is that unobservable that is common to brothers; for fathers and sons, family
background is that unobservable that is common to fathers and sons. Sons
share one half of the genes of their father. Brothers may share from virtually
0 to 100 percent but on average would also share 50 percent of the genes of
their common father. However, fathers and sons are not raised in the same
homes and hence not in the same home environments. Conversely, brothers,
who have a wider variance in shared genes, are raised in a common home by
a common mother.
While we cannot estimate the relative contributions of genes and environment,
we can jointly estimate the two family effects, father—son and brother—brother.
We assume an error—components model where the error is partitioned into a
brother—brother family component, a father—son family component and a stochastic
component. By construction, the brother—brother component includes only those25
things common to brothers that are not common to fathers and sonswhile the
father—son component includes only those things common to fathers and sons
that are not common to brothers. We jointly estimate the components using
a maximum likelihood extimator (LISREL). Table 9 summarizes theresults.
The estimated brother—brother variance component is significantly above
the estimated father—son variance component. For log wealth, that unobservable
common to brothers alone explains about 20 to 23 percent of thevariance
while that unobservable common to fathers and sons explains about 8 to 10
percent of the variance. For log incomes the percentages are about10 percent
and 15 percent respectively.
VIII INDIVIDUAL VERSUS FAMILY EFFECTS
The panel nature of our data allow us to consider unobserved individual
effects as well as unobserved family effects since we can use observations
on the same individual at different points in time. Unobservedindividual
effects would include those aspects of individual ability that do not change
with time and which are not shared with a sibling. Those aspects of ability
that might change with time are not considered in our analysis. Some, however,
will be captured by the changes in observed individual characteristics such
as occupation that occur with time. We estimate, then, a variance or error
components model using paired brothers with paired observations oneach individual
(since we have more than pairs of observations on each Individual, our data
allow for potentially richer and more complex specifications than thatestimated
here. We intend to pursue such models later.)We assume that the error
is generated by a process that includes a family effect, an individualeffect




where i indexes the family, j indexes the individual and k indexes time.
While we use a maximum likelihood estimator (LISREL), loosely, the covariances
between years for the same individual estimate the sum of an individual variance
component and a family variance component while the covariances between sibs
estimate the family component. The family variance component is, thus, directly
estimated while that for the individual is easily recoverable. The observed
error variances for individuals estimate the sum of the family individual
and stochastic components. Table 10 provides estimates for log income and
log wealth for brothers.
Adjusting for the differences in the variances of log income and log wealth
we find that the percentage of the variance attributable to the unobserved
family effect continues to be in the .22—.28 range for wealth and the .15—.19
range for income. The interesting aspect of this model of the covariance
structure for brothers is the relative importance of individual effects for
wealth and income. For wealth, we find that the unobserved individual variance
component is about one half that of the unobserved family variance component.
For income, however, the unobserved individual effect dominates, being over
twice that for the family effect. Moreover, while observable characteristics
explain over 20 percent of the variance in wealth and about 10 percent of
the variance in log income, the total variance explained by observable and
unobservable family and individual characteristics is about 50 percent of
the variance of wealth but around 65 percent of the variance of income.
Again, if ability differences are enhanced by efficient human capital
transfers from parents to children but these transfers are then offset by27
wealth transfers that are compensatory, the pattern we observe of relatively
larger individual effects and smaller family effects for income and relatively
smaller individual effects and larger family effects for wealth would be produced.
Nothing in this explanation would suggest, of course, that the combined effects
would explain a large or small amount of the variance. It is simply the case
for our data, that the explained variance from the regression analysis on
observed characteristics alone gives a much distorted picture of the nature
of the stochastic contribution to the distributions of income and wealth.
IX CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The variance in family backgrounds appears to be an important contributor
to the dispersion of individual income and wealth. We conclude, based on
the differences between the effect of unobserved family background on income
and wealth, that these effects are more likely related to permanent differences
than transitory differences in the distribution. While we find that part of
this effect is reflected in occupational choices made by related individuals
and another part is explained by the observed socioeconomic position of the
father, most of the effect cannot be explained by either of these two avenues
of intergenerational transmission.
We also find that unobserved individual differences are important contributors
to the variance in socioeconomic positions. Observable individual charac-
teristics, unobservable individual characteristics and unobservable family
effects explain over one half of the variance in income and in wealth. This
poses a problem for policy arguments that are based on stochastic elements
dominating the distributions or on providing greater equality of opportunity
within which individuals can make choices. Models of family allocational28
rules,ability, and socioeconomic rewards should accommodate two important
empirical results. First, we found that while unobservable Individual effects
were important determinants of both income and wealth distributions, they
are relatively more important determinants of the distribution of income.
Second, while we also found that unobservable family effects were important
determinants of both income and wealth distributions, they are relatively
more important in determining the distribution of wealth.
We have suggested at various points, that much of what we observe seems
to us to be consistent with an efficient investment—cum—compensatory transfer
allocational rule but our efforts do not provide a direct test of an allocational
model since none of our specifications are specifically constrained by such
a rule. Thus, the relatively more important family effect for wealth could
reflect either equal transfers within family where resources differed (including
time) between families or else compensating transfers such that sibling wealth
positions looked more alike than would be predicted from incomes.
We do suggest that permanent/transitory differences between wealth and
income may explain the larger family effect on wealth. This cannot be a complete
explanation, however, or we would expect that unobserved individual differences,
alsopresumed to be more permanent, would also explain proportionally more
of the distribution of wealth than the distribution of income. Since this
is not the case, a more complex phenomenon is presumably generating the data




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Structure of the Father—Son Data Sets for Wealth
1. Year 1860 1870 1870 1880 1890 1900
CensusCensus Tax Tax Tax Tax
Assess— Assess— Assess— Assess—
2. Father's ment ment ment ment
Mean Age... 59 64 65 67 67 71
3. Mean
Age 31 34 34 37 38 41
4. Mean Ln
of Father's
Wealth...,. 7.12 7.30 7.03 7.01 7.58 7.31
5. Mean Ln
of Son's
Wealth 6.56 6.78 7.06 6.64
6. Variance
of Ln Wealth
of Father.. .73 1.09 .82 1.07 1.09 1.36
7. Variancp
of Ln Wealth





Wealth .22 .29 .29 .17 .23 .02
9. Number
of Father—









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Structure of the Brother Data Sets for Wealth
1, Year 1860 1870 1870 1880 1890 1900
CensusCensus Tax Tax Tax Tax
Asses— Assess— Assess— Assess—
2. Mean of nient ment ment ment
First
Brother'
























Wealth..... .43 .43 .37 .34 .33 .20
9. Number
of Brother
Pairs 280 399 169 246 443 43535
Table 4
Intraclass Correlation of Lnlncome for Brothers





Specification 1: Sweeping Regression includes constant and year dummies.
Specificaton 2: Sweeping Regression includesconstant, year dummies, age
and age
Specification 3: Sweeping Regression includesconstant, year dummies, age,
age ,T,R, and FB.
Specification 4: Sweeping Regression includesconstant, year dummies, age,
age ,T,R, FB, W, C, L, and S.
See Table A.1 for estimates.36
Table 5
Intraclass Correlation of LnWealth for Brothers





Specification 1: Sweeping Regression includes constant and yeardummies.
Specificatjon 2: Sweeping Regression includes constant, yeardummies, age
and age'.
Spec1fcation 3; Sweeping Regressionincludes constant, year dummies, age,
age ,T,R, ad FB.
Specifcation 4: Sweeping Regressionincludes constant, year dummies, age,
age ,T,R, FB, W C, L, and S.
See Table A.2 for estimates.37
Table 6
Comparison of Intraclass Correlations for
Full and Half Brothers
Full Brothers Half Brothers
Ln(Y) Ln(W) Ln(Y) Ln(W)
Specification r t r t r t r t
1 .194 (13.1) .350 (20.4) .198 (7.0) .212 (6.5)
2 .201 (13.6) .313 (18.2) .205 (10.3) .271 (8.4)
3 .191 (12.9) .302 (17.5) .189 (6.7) .260 (7.9)
4 .178 (12.0) .290 (16.7) .146 (5.1) .225 (6.9)
Specification 1: Sweeping Regression includes constant and year dummies.
Specificaton 2: Sweeping Regression includesconstant, year dummies, age
and age
Specification 3: Sweeping Regressionincludes constant, year dummies, age,
age ,T,R, and FB.
Specification 4: Sweeping Regressionincludes constant, year dummies, age,
age ,T,R, FB, W, C, L, and S.
See Tables A.3 and A.4 for estimates for full brothers and Tables A.5 and
A.6 for half brothers.Table 7
Intraclass Correlation of Brothers with
Measured Common Family Attributes







See Table 4 and Tables A.9 and A.10.
For specification S we add, for each brother, the father'scharacteristics
except wealth to the sweeping regression.
For specification 6 we add, for each brother, the father'scharacteristics

















Intraclass Correlations of Fathers and Sons
Income Wealth
r t r t
Specification 1 .09 5.92 .10 5.15
Specification 2 .18 12.57 .2211.69
Specification 3 .1711.98 .20 10.96
Specification 4 .1510.48 .18 9.70
Specification 1: Sweeping Regression includes constant and year dummies.
Specification 2: Sweeping Regression includes constant, yeardummies, age
and age
Specification 3: Sweeping Regression includes constant, yeardummies, age,
age ,1,R, and FB.
Specifcatlon 4: Sweeping Regression includes constant, yeardummies, age,
age ,T,R, FB, W, C, L, and S.
See Table A.7 and A.8 for estimates.40
Table9
Different Aspects of Common Family Background
All Brothers Full Brothers
Ln Wealth Ln Income Ln Wealth Ln Income
Varince t Variance t Variance t Variance t
Fathers/Sons .08 3.30 .07 4.22 .09 3.65 .08 4.09
Brothers .20 6.84 .10 4.66 .20 6.56 .11 4.84
2 .48 30.29 .44 34.39 .41 26.40 .40 29.93
2wealth or
income .98 .73 .88 .7141
Table 10
Measurement of Individual and Family Effects for Brothers
Ln Income Ln Wealth
2 % of total 2 % of total
variance variance




(Occupation, age, etc) .09 13 .17 18
Unobserved Individual Effect .22 32 .08 8
Unobserved Family Efect .11 16 .18 1942
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r 0.195811 0.01313 111.915
LNINCOME 6.05146 0.82302
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D61 0.O9498 0.2932 0.28737 0.011553 6.3112
D66 0.06989 0.251199 0.311450 0.05025 6.2583
D70 0.06201 0.211119 0.11698 0.05237 2.2335
D75 0.06738 0.25071 0.18016 0.05088 3.51107
D80 0.081423 0.27776 0.15762 0.014727 3.33116
D85 0.1)4373 0.350811 0.111936 0.014057 3.6812
D90 0.12939 0.33566 0.05193 0.011170 1.211514
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r O.2O451 0.01311 15.6014
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD ESTIMATED STANDARDT—RATIO
NAME DEVIATION COEFFICIENTERROR 5568 DF
LNINCOME 6.05)46 0.82302
D55 0.02115 0.1)4389 0.140729 0.08081 5.0)401
D57 0.07169 0.25799 0.145265 0.05205 8.6970
D59 0.03979 0.195147 0.39291 0.06275 6.2613
D61 0.091498 0.29322 0.1414133 0.014716 9.3585
D66 0.06989 0.251199 0.39509 0.0507)4 7.7859
D7O 0.06201 0.2)4119 0.16500 0.05225 3.1579
D75 0.06738 0.25071 0.21766 0.050143 14.3159
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D9O 0.12939 0.33566 0.10090 0.014123 2.141172
D95 0.06882 0.25317 —0.022314 0.014962 —0.145015
DOO 0.1)4695 0.351409
AGE 110.552 12.233 0.06810 0.00525 12.960










14.2930 0.11790 36.1411TABLE A. 1 (Corit'd)

















r 0.19190 0.0131)4 114.603
LNINCOME 6.O546 0.82302
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D66 0.06989 0.25499 0.140855 0.05090
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D75 0.06738 0.25071 0.23600 0.05035
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D55 0.02115 O.14389 0.57622 0.08006 7.1975
D57 0.07169 0.25799 0.57)465 0.0526)4 10.917
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D85 0.114373 0.350814 0.26772 0.03994 6.7031
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DOO 0.1)4695 0.35)409
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AGE2 1794.1 1083.4 —0.00068 0.00006 —11.7914
FBE 0.2)4)498 0.143012 0.01428)4 0.02519 1.7005
T 14.965 11.680 0.00933 0.00186 5.0228
R 0.82204 0.38251 —0.23154 0.02878 —8.0464
W 0.08298 0.27587 0.55720 0.03918 14.223
C 0.09462 0.29272 —0.05692 0.03668 —1.5517





























D60 0.111199 0.3)4908 -.0.11358 0.05355 -.2.1212
D70 0.20233 0.4O179 0.02603 0.0)48)4)4 0.537)4
DD7O 0.08570 0.27996 —0.32701 0.06335 —5.1623
D80 0.12475 0.330147 —0.31603 0.05575 —5.6687













6.9021 0.03351 205.99TABLE A. 2 (Cont'd)








































































0.16369TABLE A. 2 (Cont'd)

















r 0.29)486 0.01522 19.3714
LNWEALTH 6.8751 1.0050
D6O 0.114199 0.314908 0.33829 0.051402 6.2625
D7O 0.20233 0.140179 0.332)47 0.014684 7.0977
DD7O 0.08570 0.27996 O.O21b)4 0.06025 0.3592
D80 0.121475 0.33047 —0.09052 0.05226 —1.7321
D90 0.221465 O.14174O 0.147381 0.014451 10.6450
DUO 0.22059 0.411470
AGE )40.182 11.393 0.09326 0.00733 12.7260
AGE2 17414.14 1014.6 —0.00082 0.00008—10.1390
FBE 0.25685 0.143695 0.176111 0.031425 —5.1512
T 114.137 10.1409 0.01321 0.002)40 5.5040





INTERCEPT 11.4869 0.16507 27.182TABLE A. 2 (Cont'd)

















r O.277t9 0.01530 18.135
LNWEALTH 6.8751 1.0050
D6O 0.1)4199 0.311908 0.112889 0.053145 8.02140
D7O 0.20233 0.110179 0.39568 O.Ol62O 8.5655
DD7O 0.08570 0.27996 0.07721 0.05921 1.30)40
D80 0.12)475 0.330)47 —0.0)4709 0.051)40 —0.9162
D9O 0.22)465 0.1117140 0.117836 0.0)436)4 10.9610
DOO 0.22059 0.1111170
AGE 110.182 11.393 0.08865 0.00721 12.3010
AGE2 17411.11 101)4.6 —0.00077 0.00008 —9.7207
FBE 0.25685 0.113695 —0.1)4751 0.03368 —'4.3803
T 1)4.137 10.1409 0.01)415 0.00235 6.0210
B 0.80857 0.393)48 —0.3680)4 0.03779 —9.7)4014
W 0.07201 0.25853 0.23766 0.05687 4.1787
C 0.10066 0.30092 —0.39603 0.01186)4 —8.1426









REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR




























D55 0.02561 0.15797 0.22369 0.081477 2.6389
D57 0.086142 0.28102 0.26717 0.05543 14.8197
D59 0.014527 0.20791 0.21116 0.06817 3.0976
D61 0.113140 0.31711 0.30976 0.05158 6.0050
D66 0.08093 0.27276 0.35031 0.056148 6.202u
D70 0.070142 0.25588 0.114690 0.058o8 2.14950
D75 0.070142 0.25588 0.19951 0.05888 3.3886
D80 0.08962 0.28567 0.18709 0.05487 3.14095
D85 0.13352 0.314017 0.165149 0.014962 3•335
D90 0.11203 0.315143 0.09852 0.051(14 1.9040






TABLE A. 3 (Cont'd)
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR




r 0.20139 0.011481 13.5914
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD ESTIMATED STANDARD




12.33300 0.06828 0.00590 11.57140









D55 0.02561 0.15797 0.1414002 0.08572 5.1332
D57 0.086142 0.28102 0.1491462 0.058143 8.14658
D59 0.014527 0.20791 0.141315 0.06970 5.9275
D61 0.113140 0.31711 0.148135 0.05386 8.9379
D66 0.08093 0.27276 0.14143143 0.057142 7.7227
D70 0.070142 0.25588 0.1914614 O.0589'4 3.30214
D75 0.070142 0.25588 0.22235 0.05837 3.8092
D80 0.08962 0.28567 0.22355 0.051425 14.1207
D85 0.13352 0.3)4017 0.22800 0.0149148 14.6081
D90 0.11203 0.315143 0.114218 0.05097 2.7895




14.2306 0.133514 31.679TABLE A. 3 (Cont'd)
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR
















AGE '40.66900 12.33300 0.063914 0.00595 10.7)180
AGE2 1806.00000 1092.30000 —U.000bt5 U.UUUU( —1U.JUU
T 114.92700 11.67000 0.00665 0.0O2i3 3.12014
R 0.801453 0.39661 —0.2141214 0.03101 —7.7803






D55 0.02561 0.15797 0.148262 0.08678 5.5615
D57 0.086)42 0.28102 0.149933 0.06002 8.3198
D59 0.014527 0.20791 0.39610 0.07078 5.5960
D61 0.113)40 0.31711 0.148599 0.0514914 8.81452
D66 0.08093 0.27276 0.145296 0.05758 7.86614
D70 0.070)12 0.25588 0.22070 0.05913 3.7321
D75 0.070142 0.25588 0.23333 0.05822 14.0080
D8O 0.08962 0.28567 0.21)405 0.0514148 3.9292
D85 0.13352 0.314017 0.24592 0.0)1960 14.9583
D90 0.11203 0.315)43 0.16)136 0.050714 3.2390







TABLE A. 3 (Cont'd)
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR




r 0.17855 0.011488 11.991
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD ESTIMATED STANDARD T—RATIO
NAME DEVIATION COEFFICIENT ERROR 143141 DF
LNINCOME6.06520 0.81576
AGE 140.66900 12.33300 0.06291 0.00588 10.7020
AGE2 1806.00000 1092.30000 —0.00066 0.00007 —10.21490
T 114.92700 11.67000 0.007114 0.00210 3.14009
H 0.801453 0.39661 —0.22)406 0.03128 —7.1624
FBE 0.2148714 0.143233 0.051Ui3 0.02807 1.9535
W 0.07385 0.26155 0.1468514 0.0146214 10.13)40
C 0.10357 0.301473 0.03967 —1.1769
F 0.70553 0.145586
S 0.03155 0.171482 0.014509 0.06811 0.6621
L 0.078142 0.26886 0.0141466 —5.37143
D55 0.02561 0.15797 0.561417 0.08590 6.5677
D57 0.086142 0.28102 0.58151 0.05972 9.73714
D59 0.0)4527 0.20791 0.146550 0.07001 6.6)488
D61 0.113140 0.31711 0.56099 0.051456 10.2820
D66 0.08093 0.27276 0.50286 0.05695 8.8306
D70 0.070)42 0.25588 0.263)43 0,058iJ4 14.5078
D75 0.070)42 0.25588 0.26338 0.057)45 14.58)45
D8O 0.08962 0.28567 0.2)4125 0.05378 14.14860
D85 0.13352 0.314017 0.26010 0.014891 5.3176
D9O 0.11203 0.315143 0.18370 0.05005 3.670u
D95 0.06081 0.23902 —0.032314 0.05925 —0.51458
D00 0.11157 0.314o7
INTERCEPT 14.14510 0.13683 32.528TABLE A. 14
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR


















D60 0.17632 0.38115 —0.19100 0.058149 —3.2655
D70 0.23158 0.142191 —0.03560 0.0514914 —0.6)480
DD7O 0.10263 0.303143 —0.38333 0.06807 —5.631
D80 0.13158 0.33809 —0.314506 0.06321 —5.4591













NTABLE A. 14 (Conttd)
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR














r 0.313147 0.01723 18.195
LNWEALTH 6.89570 0.96879
AGE 140.113600 11.50000 0.097514 0.00800 12.1930
AGE2 1767.20000 1031.30000 —0.00080 0.00009 —8.9695
D6O 0.17632 0.38115 0.20090 0.058714 3.14201
D70 0.23158 0.142191 0.17763 0.05319 3.3398
DD7O 0.10263 0.303)43 —0.14731 0.065110 —2.2523
D80 0.13158 0.33809 —0.19784 0.05998 —3.2983
D9O 0.18618 0.38932 0.32611 0.051482 5.911811
DUO 0.17171 0.37719
w 0.06151 0.214031






INTERCEPT )4.2625 0.18051 23.6111
R2
NINTERCEPT
TABLE A. 11 (Cont'd)
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR




r 0.30289 0.01729 17.517
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD ESTIMATED TANDARD T—RATIO
NAME DEVIATIONCOEFFICIENTERROR 3034 DF
LNWEALTH6.89570 0.96879
AGE 140.43600 11.50000 0.09180 0.00797 11.5250
AGE2 1767.20000 1031.30000 —0.00083 0.00009
D60 0.17632 0.38115 0.22976 0.05985 3.8393
D70 0.23158 0.42191 0.24606 0.053u3 4.6398
DD7O 0.10263 0.303)43 —0.07528 0.06488 —1.1604
D80 0.13158 0.33809 —0.15646 0.05923 —2.6418






FBE 0.28586 0.45190 —0.21721 0.03595 —6.0)427
R 0.80789 0.39)402 —0.338011 0.041146 —8.1527
T 111.20500 10.37300 0.01285 0.00258 4.9800
R2
NTABLE A. 4 (Cont'd)
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR













r 0.28975 0.01736 16.686
LNWEALTH6.89570 0.96879
AGE 40.43600 11.50000 0.08659 0.00788 10.989
AGE2 1767.20000 1031.30000 —0.00078 o.oooog —8.9773
D6O 0.17632 0.38115 0.30912 0.05933 5.2102
D70 0.23158 0.42191 0.30290 0.05243 5.7769
DD7O 0.10263 0.30343 —0.02916 0.06396 —0.45597
D80 0.13158 0.33809 —0.12335 0.05835 —2.1139
D90 0.18618 0.38932 0.37717 0.05318 7.1037
DOO 0.17171 0.37719
w 0.06151 0.24031 0.22547 0.06680 3.3755
C 0.10855 0.31113 —0.33499 0.05195 .6.14478
L 0.08322 0.27627 —0.46928 0.05805 —8.0845
S 0.03092 0.17313 —0.24455 0.09206 —2.6563
FEE 0.28586 0.45190 —0.18481 0.03553 —5.201u












REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR
INCOME OF HALF BROTHERS
EQUATION 1
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD ESTIMATED STANDARD T—RATIO












D55 0.001498 0.07039 0.142792
D57 0.018214 0.13388 0.22270
D59 0.01990 0.13972 0.1401420
D61 0.02819 0.16559 0.27106
D66 0.02985 0.17025 0.16022
D70 0.03151 0.171476 0.031144
D75 0.05639 0.23076 0.161490
D80 0.061468 0.214606 0.09360
D85 0.18076 0.381498 0.132475
D90 0.19237 0.392433 —0.03128






























r 0.19782 0.02825 7.002R2
N
TABLE A. 5 (Cont'd)
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR




r 0.20453 0.019914 10.258
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD ESTIMATED STANDARD T—RATIO
NAME DEVIATION COEFFICIENT ERROR 1206 DF
LNINCOME 6.0159 0.811808
AGE 40.12500 11.86000 0.06909 0.01181 5.8520









D55 0.00)498 0.07039 0.58815 0.314521 1.7037
D57 0.01824 0.13388 0.45228 0.18886 2.39148
D59 0.01990 0.13972 0.53057 0.17882 2.9671
D61 0.02819 0.16559 0.43192 0.154140 2.7975
D66 O.02935 0.17025 0.2607)4 0.114880 1.7523
D70 0.03151 0.17476 0.16472 0.14606 1.1278
D75 0.05639 0.23076 0.29045 O.11149 2.5414
D80 0.06468 0.214606 0.15085 0.10621 1.4203
D85 0.18076 0.38498 0.20216 0.07)492 2.6983
D90 0.19237 0.39433 0.02579 0.07310 0.3529
D95 0.09784 0.29723 0.048)42 0.08939 0.5417
D0O 0.27529 0.144685
INTERCEPT 4.3685 0.26267 16.631R2
N
TABLE A. 5 (Cont'd)
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR




1' 0.18889 0.02830 6.675
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD ESTIMATED STANDARD T—RATIO
NAME DEVIATION COEFFICIENTERROR 1206 DF
LNINCOME 6.0159 0.814808
AGE 140.12500 11.86L000 0.057914 0.01189 11.8738
AGE2 1750.60000 10149.70000 -0.00075 0.00013 —5.731
T 15.10100 11.72100 0.01871 0.Oo11￿6 11.3901
R 0.88557 0.318146 —0.388614 0.07779 —4.9961
FBE 0.231314 0.142187 —0.02936 0.06555 —0.141479
D55 0.001198 0.07039 0.8228)4 0.3)4279 2.1400)4
D57 0.0182.14 0.13388 0.52819 0.18923 2.7913
D59 0.01990 0.13972 0.5885ti 0.1814143 3.1913
D61 0.02819 0.16559 0.146792 0.16030 2.9190
D66 O.02955 0.17025 0.35003 0.15588 2.21456
D70 0.03151 0.171476 0.251452 0.114789 1.7210
D75 0.05639 0.23076 0.37892 0.116014 3.2653
D80 0.061168 0.214606 0.21162 0.10789 1.9615
D85 0.18076 0.38)198 0.27265 0.07626 3.5753
D90 0.19237 0.39)433 0.1207)4 0.07387 1.63)45







INTERCEPT 14.8957 0.27183 18.010R2
N 1206
TABLE A. 5 (Cont'd)
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR
INCOME OF HALF BROTHERS
0 •114514
EQUATION 14
r O.11554 0.02851 5.105
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD ESTIMATED STANDARD
NAME DEVIATION COEFFICIENT ERROR 120b DF
LNINCOME 6.0159 0.814808
AGE 140.12500 11.86000 0.05967 0.0111414 5.2179Or1
AGE2 1750.60000 10119.70000 —0.00073 0.00013 ,-—.oui
T 15.10100 11.72100 0.018'16 0.001410 11.50142
R 0.88557 0.318116 —0.32528 0.07536 14.3166
FBE 0.2313k O.)42187 0.01091 O.O63uO 0.1731
W 0.11609 0.320116 0.769147 0.07)4)48 10.3310
C 0.06219 0.2)4160 0.131469 0.095911 —1.)4O4O
F 0.69)486 0.146066
S 0.03151 0.17)476 —0.06193 0.13130 O.14717
L 0.09)453 0.29268 —0.03215 0.07991 0.11023
D55 0.001498 0.07039 0.9873)4 0.32820 3.008)4
D57 0.018214 0.13388 0.7214142 0.18179 3.9850
D59 0.01990 0.13972 0.66866 0.17656 3.7873
D61 0.02819 0.16559 0.61956 0.151436 14.0136
D66 0.02985 0.17025 0.11)461411 0.1119112 2.9878
D70 0.03151 0.171176 O.41551 0.114218 2.922'4
D75 0.05639 0.23076 0.148327 0.111143 14.3370
D80 0.061468 0.214606 0.33520 0.1039)4 3.2250
D85 0.18076 0.38)498 0.361459 0,07351 11.9599
D90 0.19237 0.39)433 0.181914 0.07098 2.56311
D95 0.0978)4 0.29723 0.111141 O.O8'156 1.3175
DO0 0.27529 0.1414685
INTERCEPT 14.5878 0.26472 17.331TABLE A. 6
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR

















































r 0.21203 0.03254 6.516
115.52TABLE A. 6 (Conttd)
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR




r 0.27051 0.03205 8.1139
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD ESTIMATED STANDARD
NAME DEVIATIONCOEFFICIENT ERROR 889 DF
LNWEALTH6.80570 1.11620
AGE 39.33100 10.99100 0.09393 0.01796 5.2311
AGE2 1667.60000 953.01000 —0.00063 0.00021 —3.09311
D6O 0.02655 0.16085 0.118980 0.22126 2.2137
D70 0.10398 0.305111 0.29903 0.12109 2.116911
DD7O 0.02876 0.16723 0.06763 0.21281 0.3178
D80 0.10177 0.30251 —0.05056 0.123i7 —0.11105














TABLE A. 6 (Cont'd)
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR




r 0.25524 0.03219 7.928
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD ESTIMATED STANDARD T.-RATIO
NAME DEVIATIONCOEFFICIENT ERROR 889 DF
LNWEALTH 6.80570 1.11620
AGE 39.33100 10.99100 0.09619 0.01794 5.3604
AGE2 1667.60000 953.01000 —0.00074 0.00021 3.6162
D60 0.02655 0.16085 0.37469 0.23087 1.6229
D70 0.10398 0.30541 0.38589 0.12997 2.9691
DD7O 0.02876 0.16723 0.21007 0.21556 0.9745
D80 0.10177 0.30251 —0.00771 0.12266 —0.6283
D9O 0.35398 0.47847 0.67350 0.08375 8.01119
DO0 0.38496 0.48685
FBE 0.15929 0.36615 —0.00473 0.10347 —0.4575
R 0.810814 0.39185 —0.43687 0.08952 —'4.8802







14.1889 0.39289 10.662TABLE A. 6 (Cont'd)
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR
















r 0.22467 0.O3215 6.925
LNWEALTH6.80570 1.11620
AGE 39.33100 10.99100 0.09332 0.01737 5.3726
AGE2 1667.60000 953.01000 —0.00072 0.00020 —3.655
D60 0.02655 0.16085 O.498O3 0.22616 2.2021
D70 0.10398 0.305111 0.118216 0.12635 3.8161
DD7O 0.02876 0.16723 0.33383 0.210111 1.5886
D80 0.10177 0.30251 0.07918 0.12001 0.6597
D90 0.35398 0.1178117 0.65758 0.08132 8.0861
D00 0.381196 0.48685
W 0.10730 0.30967 0.29713 0.11155 2.6635
C 0.071fl2 0.26210 0.12680 —5.1090
L 0.08297 0.27598 —0.66933 0.120117 —5.5559
S 0.02876 0.16723 0.12237 0.19618 0.6238
FBE 0.15929 0.36615 0.00556 0.10023 0.55145









REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR















r 0.08672 O.01465 5.918
LNINCOME6.06330 0.86465
D55 0.03460 0.18279 0.36219 0.07762 14.66614
D57 0.07915 0.27001 0.37080 0.O58e9 6.2962
D59 0.014931 0.21653 0.23608 0.068314 3.145147
D61 0.112146 0.31596 0.380)47 0.05367 7.0892
D66 0.08261 0.27533 0.38507 0.05818 6.6185
D70 O.O6964 0.251456 0.11412)4 0.06115 2.3096
D75 0.07050 0.25602 0.2)4302 0.06093 3.9888
D80 0.093143 0.29106 0.17199 0.05626 3.0572
D85 0.114273 0.314984 0.099142 0.05083 1.9559
D90 0.10727 0.30949 0.0719)4 0.05430 1.3250
















TABLE A. 7 (Conttd)
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR
INCOME OF FATHERS AND SONS
0.1073
EQUATION 2




COEFFICIENT ERROR 14612 DF
LNINCOME6.06330 0.861465
D55 0.031460 0.18279 0.1421481 0.07500 5.6639
D57 0.07915 0.27001 O.li3003 0.05719 7.5197
D59 0.014931 0.21653 0.28086 0.06605 14.2525
D61 0.112146 0.31596 0.140109 0.05201 7.71114
D66 0.08261 0.27533 0.37150 0.05609 6.6239
D70 0.069614 0.251456 0.13025 0.05880 2.2154
D75 0.07050 0.25602 0.245140 0.05856 4.1909
D8O 0.093)43 0.29106 0.18901 0.051412 3.14926














AGE 47.9214 17.990 0.07787 0.00398 19.547











TABLE A. 7 (Cont'd)
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR
INCOME OF FATHERS AND SONS
EQUATION 3
0.17357 0.01)4)49 11.982
VARIABLEMEAN STANDARD ESTIMATED STANDARD T-.RATIO
NAME DEVIATION COEFFICIENT ERROR 11612 DF
LNINCOME 6.0633 0.86)465
D55 0.03)460 0.18279 0.66891 0.08129 8.228)4
D57 0.07915 0.27001 0.6)4756 0.06503 9.9581
D59 0.014931 0.21653 0.147662 0.07176 6.61119
D61 0.112116 0.31596 0.60825 0.05865 10.371
D66 0.08261 0.27533 0.55628 0.06052 9.1911
D70 0.O6961 0.25)456 0.29862 0.06156 11.8510
D75 0.07050 0.25602 0.38106 0.06033 6.3165
D80 0.093)43 0.29106 0.28702 0.05552 5.1698
D85 O.1l4273 0.3)49814 0.22)4711 0.014982 11.5106
D90 0.10727 0.309)49 0.151)47 0.05232 2.89511
D95 0.052311 0.22273 —0.07967 0.06365 —1.2517
D00 0.10597 0.30783
AGE 147.9211 17.990 0.07018 0.00)408 17.207
AGE2 2620.3 1797.8 —0.00071 0.000014 —18.006
FBE 0.30255 0.1459111 —0.02113 O.026b2 —0.79378
T 15.768 13.126 0.01354 0.00167 8.099)4








0.1250TABLE A. 7 (Cont'd)
REGRESS0NS AND UlTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR





VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD ESTIMATED STANDARD T—RATIO
NAME DEVIATION COEFFICIENT ERROR 4612 DF
LNINCOME 6.0633 0.86)465
D55 0.031460 0.18279 0.72876 0.08081 9.0187
D57 0.07915 0.27001 0.70863 0.061483 10.930
D59 0.011931 0.21653 0.53168 0.07135 7.11520
D1 0112)4 fl7fl).I flt11F11J!i
D66 0.08261 0.27533 0.61288 0.060111 10.191
D70 0.06964 0.251456 0.311377 0.06107 5.6288
D75 0.07050 0.25602 0.240156 0.05972 6.7238
D80 0.093)43 0.29106 0.328314 0.05513 5.9561
D85 0.111273 0.34984 0.23521 0.0)4930 )4.7707
D90 0.10727 0.30949 0.16355 0.05176 3.1597
D95 0.05234 0.22273 —0.07)467 0.062911 —1.1863
DOO 0.10597 0.30783
AGE 47.92)4 17.990 0.06852 0.001405 16.913
AGE2 2620.3 1797.8 —0.00069 0.00004—17.595
FBE 0.30255 0.459)41 —0.00528 0.026)47 —0.19959
T 15.768 13.126 0.01365 0.00165 8.2519
R 0.82288 0.38181 —0.1637)4 0.03198 —5.1207
W 0.06856 0.25272 0.112561 0.011813 8.8)133
C 0.1228J4 0.32829 —0.12843 0.03673 —3.4967













REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR





























































154.69TABLE A. 8 (Cont'd)
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR














r 0.21711! 0.01857 11.695
LNWEALTH 6.9730 1.0276
D60 0.19089 0.39307 0.00569 0.06068 0.0938
D70 0.25958 O.4381!8 0.1350)4 0.05602 2.14108
DD7O 0.09472 0.29288 —0.12)495 0.07302 —1.7112
D80 0.11569 0.31991 0.211061 0.06833 —3.5210
D90 0.15691 0.36378 0.357)48 0.06265 5.706)4
D0O 0.18221 0.38609
AGE 50.528 17.759 0.09538 0.00651 1)4.660








INTERCEPT 4.3378 0.16130 26.893R2
N
TABLE A. 8 (Cont'd)
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR



























































































27.413TABLE A. 8 (Cont'd)
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR














r 0.181143 0.01871 9.700
LNWEALTH 6.9730 1.0276
D60 0.19089 0.39307 0.149707 0.07271 6.8366
D70 0.25958 0.1438148 0.52379 0.06116 8.56142
DD7O 0.091472 0.29288 0.26995 0.07555 3.5733
D80 0.11569 0.31991 0.02091 0.06777 0.308147
D90 0.15691 0.36378 0.146673 0.05979 7.8067
DO0 0.18221 0.38609
AGE 50.528 17.759 0.079142 0.00630 12.598
AGE2 2868.3 1866.3 —0.00072 0.00006 -.12.109
FBE 0.330141! 0.1470146 —0.1931414 0.03730 —5.1858
T 17.910 12.332 0.02718 0.002142 11.222
R 0.82538 0.37971 —0.369145 0.0)4613 —8.0087
W 0.06580 0.214798 0.1414178 0.07133 6.1939
C 0.121473 0.330147 —0.270143 0.05353 —5.0523
L 0.091436 0.29238 0.06039 —6.7973
S 0.02965 O.16964 —0.032114 0.10192 —0,31536
INTERCEPT '4.6128 0.16319 28,266R2
N
TABLE A. 9








STANDARD ESTIMATED STANDARD T—RATIO














D55 0.02198 0.14666 0.12760 0.14616 0.87303
D57 0.07936 0.27039 0.08562 0.091404 0.910)48
D59 0.05250 0.22311 0.06189 0.10628 0.58230
D61 0.15140 0.35855 0.07734 0.08100 0.95473
D66 0.08791 0.28325 0.20206 0.09152 2.20770
D70 0.063)49 0.24392 0.04404 0.10021 0.439118
D75 0.07082 0.25660 0.11255 0.09707 1.15950
D8O 0.085147 0.27967 0.06901 0.09220 0.7)4855
D85 0.16239 0.36892 —0.10290 0.07995 —1.28720
D9O 0.10379 0.30507 —0.03015 0.08783 —0.34330


















INTERCEPT 6.0107 0.06362 914.1476TABLE A. 9 (Cont'd)






r 0.16709 0.02386 7.0011
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD ESTIMATED STANDARD T—RATIO
NAME DEVIATION COEFFICIENTERROR 1632 DF
LNINCOME 6.0)4830 0.79167
AGE 33.80)400 9.)4689O 0.05779 0.00950 6.08580









D55 0.02198 0.114666 0.14)4293 0.14)41)4 3.07290
D57 0.07936 0.27039 0.112330 0.09601 4.4O890
D59 0.05250 0.22311 0.1411143 0.10759 3.82)410
D61 0.151)40 0.35855 0.3811)41 0.08318 11.621110
D66 0.08791 0.28325 0.35967 0.08977 4.0O67O
D70 0.063119 0.211392 0.15851 O.09747 1.62620
D75 0.07082 0.25660 0.26195 0.09)477 2.76)420
D80 0.085)47 0.27967 0.15723 0.08961 1.75470
D85 0.16239 0.36892 0.06372 0.07873 0.80933
D9O 0.10379 0.30507 0.072811 0.08538 0.85303






















TABLE A. 9 (Cont'd)






r 0.15238 0.02391 6.372
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD ESTIMATED STANDARD T—RATIO
NAME DEVIATION COEFFICIENTERROR 1632 DF
LNINCOME 6.0)4830 0.79167
AtE 33.80)400 9.246890 0.05080 0.01040 '4.88620






D55 0.02198 0.1)4666 0.511)40 0.1)4)403 3.55060
D57 0.07936 0.27039 0.141025 0.097214 24.21910
D59 0.05250 0.22311 0.241859 0.108110 3.861)40
D61 0.151)40 0.3585, 0.1111430 0.08)405 11.92930
D66 0.08791 0.28325 0.39014)4 0.08976 24,3)4970
D70 0.063)49 0.2)4392 0.21721 0.098112 2.20710
D75 0.07082 0.25660 0.29965 0.091450 3.17100
D80 0.085)47 0.27967 0.15905 0.08951 1.77690
D85 0.16239 0.36892 0.124724)4 0.08012 1.8)4020
D90 0.10379 0.30507 0.114980 0.08589 1.7)4410
D95 0.02686 0.16173 —0.08735 0.13015 -.0.67114
T 9.22)410 8.13820 0.01082 0.00386 2.80000
R 0.811005 0.36667 —0.315)49 0.05362 —5.881420


















INTERCEPT 1.7839 0.21995 21.750TABLE A. 9 (Cont'd)
















AGE 33.801100 9.116890 0.05172 0.01015 5.09670
AGE2 1232.30000 7611.68000 0.000141 0.00012 3.561114O
P55 O.Ud19 U.lLIbbb U.b59U5 U.1415t$ 4.b55UU
D57 0.07936 0.27039 0.589146 0.09670 6.09600
D59 0.05250 0.22311 0.59166 0.10721 5.51880
D61 0.151110 0.35855 0.58329 0.08397 6.9116140
D66 0.08791 0.28325 0.52915 0.0887)4 5.96290
D70 0.063119 0.211392 0.29818 0.096142 3.092110
D75 0.07082 0.25660 0.37312 0.09256 11.03130
D8O 0.085)47 0.27967 0.211988 0.08816 2.83)4110
P85 0.16239 0.36892 0.18922 0.07806 2.142)400
D90 0.10379 0.30507 0.22720 0.08395 2.70650
D95 0.02686 0.16173 —0.020147 0.12703 —0.16117
P00 0.09)402 0.291911
T 9.221410 8.13820 0.00990 0.00375 2.6)4210
R 0.814005 0.36667 —0.29588 0.05291 —5.592110
FBE 0.2)4908 0.113261 0.0314811 0.011393 0.79307
W 0.09097 0.28765 0.607914 0.06740 9.02000
C 0.06960 0.25145)4 —0.00213 20.0729 —0.29256
F 0.70269 0.145722
S 0.03968 0.19527 —0.111266 0.09519 —1.149870

















INTERCEPT 14•5755 0.21968 20.828R2 0.0202
TABLE A. 10





r 0.26198 0.02615 10.018
VARIABLEMEAN STANDARD ESTIMATED STANDARDT—RATIO




D60 0.17099 0.37665 —0.066)4)4 0.08495 —0.78202
D70 0.21374 0.41010 0.07130 0.08037 0.88718
DD7O 0.09)466 0.29285 —0.17438 0.10137 —1.7203
D80 0.13740 0.34)4)41 —0.29980 0.09025 —3.3221























INTERCEPT 6.8113 0.05852 116.38R2
N
TABLE A. 10 (Cont'd)
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR
WEALTH OF BROTHERS




r 0.27347 0.02606 10.492
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD ESTIMATED
DF NAME DEVIATION COEFFICIENT ERROR 13O
LNWEALTH6.78630 0.93108
AGE 36.15700 8.83670 0.09118 0.01427
AGE2 1385.1O000 72)4.30000 —0.00067 0.00017
)4.2348 D6O 0.17099 0.37665 0.36567 0.08635
4.2803 D70 0.2137)4 0.111010 0.33500 0,07827
DD7O 0.09)466 0.29285 0.1)486)4 0.098)45 1.5099
D80 O.137I0 0.3)4)4)41 —0.05)492 0.08716 —0.6301























INTERCEPT 11.2008 0.3026b 13.879TABLE A. 10 (Cont'd)
REGRESSIONS AND INTRA—CLASS CORRELATIONS FOR
WEALTH OF BROTHERS











Ni 0.25632 0.02619 9.786
VARIABLEMEAN STANDARD T—RATIO
NAME ERROR 13O4 DF
LNWEALTH6.78630 0.93108
AGE 36.15700 8.83670 0.0829)4 0.01)461 5.6766
AGE2 1385.140000 724.3OOOO —0.00061 0.00017 —3551
D60 0.17099 0.37665 0.1414991 0.088)41 5.0890
D70 0.213714 O.)41010 0.142220 0.07916 5.3332
DD7O 0.09)466 0.29285 0.19)465 0.09827 1.9809
D80 0.1374O 0.3)4)4)41 —0.0350)4 0.08653 —0.14050






FBE 0.25038 0.1433)40 —0.10222 0.05618 —1.8193
T 11.151400 7.61)4)40 0.0112)4 0.00383 2.9353















INTERCEPT )4.)4658 0.30)485 1)4.6)49TABLE A. 10 (Cont'd)


















r 0.22653 0.02639 8.583
LNWEALTH6.78630 0.93108
AGE 36.15700 8.83670 0.08029 0.01)408 5.7010
AGE2 1385.U0000 724.3OO00 —0.00057 0.00017 3.14237
D60 0.17099 0.37665 0.5713)4 0.08558 6.6757
D70 0.21374 O.4i0iO 0.50236 0.07633 6.5816
DD7O 0.091466 0.29285 0.26251 0.091466 2.7732
D8O 0.137140 0.31414141 0.02812 0.08393 0.3350
D90 0.19389 0.39550 0.146922 0.07738 6.06)40
DOO 0.18931 0.39191
w 0.08015 0.27163 0.61590 0.08802 6.9976
C 0.07786 0.26806 —0.)458j6 0.08636 —5.3130
L 0.08092 0.27281 —0.116300 0.08)456
S 0.02595 0.15906 —0.3)4295 0.1)4635 —2.3)43)4
FBE 0.25038 0.1433)40 —0.05669 0.05)4)411 —1.01412
T 11.15)400 7.6114)40 0.012214 0.00367 3.3352















INTERCEPT 14.14310 0.295115 114.997TABLE A. 10 (Cont'd)










r 0.20694 0.02651 7.806
VARIABLEMEAN STANDARD T—RATIO
NAME ERROR 13O4 DF
LNWEALTH6.78630 0.93108
AGE 36.15700 8.83670 0.08734 0.01454 6.0069
AGE2 1385.40000 724.30000 —0.00062 0.00017 —3.6649
D60 0.17099 0.37665 0.96979 0,24239 14.0009
D70 0.21374 0.111010 0.79584 0.18474 4.3O79
DD7O 0.09466 0.29285 0.61668 0.19732 3.1253
D80 0.13740 0.34441 0.26166 0.14437 1.8125
D90 0.19389 0.39550 0.54553 0.09865 5.5297
DOO 0.18931 0.39191
W 0.08015 0.27163 0.45781 0.10013 4.5121
C 0.07786 0.26806 —O.49574 0.08915 —5.5606
L 0.08092 0.27281 —0.47137 0.081468 —5.5666
S 0.02595 0.15906 —0.37704 0.114623 —2.5784
FBE 0.25038 0.433140 —0.14827 0.08262 —1.7945
T 11.151400 7.61440 0.01225 0.00376 3.2550
H 0.73588 0.414103 —0.13078 0.06503 —2.0109
LNFWEALTH 7.140460 1.10730
FAGE 69.38000 8.88040 —0.00363 0.00351 —1.0327
FAGE2 4892.4000012145.40000
FW 0.06107 0.23955 0.31219 0.12144 2.5707
FC 0.108'IO 0.31100 0.08487 0.08183 1.0371
FL 0.07176 0.25818 0.25060 0.09252 2.7088
FS 0.02290 0.114964 —0.31589 0.155147 —2.0318
FFBE 0.33893 0.47353 0.11379 0.07886 1.4429
FT 26.116900 14.09100 0.01045 0.00603 1.7328
FR 0.66718 0.47140 —0.10890 0.06246
KIDS 16.31000 10.70600
INF 1.47630 2.07480
PLURAL 2.74050 1.65920 —0.00287 0.01572 —0.18240
SIB 14.75100 9.19230 —0.00343 0.00346 —0.99154
INTERCEPT 4.0238 0.44917 8.9581
R2
NTABLE A. 10 (Cont'd)






r 0.19393 0.02658 7.296
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD ESTIMATED STANDARD T—RATIO
NAME DEVIATION COEFFICIENTERROR 13014 DF
LNWEALTH6.78630 0.93108
AGE 36.15700 8.83670 0.08591 0.011436 5.9823
AGE2 1385.140000 72)4.30000 —0.00060 0.00017 —3.57514
D60 0.17099 0.37665 0.82979 0.214055 3.141196
D70 0.213714 0.141010 0.67389 0.18362 3.6701
DD7O 0.09)466 0.29285 0.51698 0.19559 2.61432
D80 0.137140 0.31414141 0.17613 0.1)4331 1.2290
D90 0.19389 0.39550 0.146236 0.098)46 14.6961
DUO 0.18931 0.39191
w 0.08015 0.27163 0.141233 0.09918 14.1573
C 0.07786 0.26806 —0.50086 0.088011 —5.6893
L 0.08092 0.27281 0.1414551 0.08373 —5.3206
S 0.02595 0.15906 0.140195 0.1)4)4)46 —2.7825
FBE 0.25038 0.1433)40 —0.15560 0.08160 —1.9070
T 11.151400 7.61)4)40 0.00893 0.00376 2.3755
H 0.73588 0.14)4103 —0.121439 0.06)423 —1.9367
LNFWEALTH 7.1401460 1.10730 0.15315 0.02630 5.8226
FAGE 69.38000 8.880140 0.00319 0.00366 0.8704
FAGE2 14892.)4000012145.140000
FW 0.06107 0.23955 0.214)407 0.120)49 2.0257
FC 0.108)40 0.31100 0.05767 0.0809)4 0.7125
FL 0.07176 0.25818 0.21712 0.09153 2.3720
FS 0.02290 0.11496)4 —0.31629 0.15352 —2.0602
FFBE 0.33893 0.147353 0.17901 0.07867 2.2755
FT 26.146900 1)4.09100 0.00578 0.00601 0.9621
FR 0.66718 0.1471)40 —0.088115 0.06178 —1.11317
SIB 14.751OO 9.19230 —0.01122 0.00367 —3.0573
PLURAL 2.7)4050 1.65920 0.001479 0.01557 0.3078
KIDS 16.31000 10.70600
INF 1.147630 2.071480
INTERCEPT 2.7530 0.149)432 5,569)4
R2
N